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I.
A state which can boast that lawyers of the caliber of Lincoln and
Darrow have been practitioners in its courts ought not, one would
suppose, have reason to apologize for the standards it sets for admis-
sion to the bar. But Illinois has twice cut off its nose to spite its face.
The first occasion was in 1869, when Myra Bradwell was denied
admission to the bar because she had the civic irresponsibility to be a
woman. The second occasion was in 1944, when 'Clyde Summers
was turned away because he had the temerity to be a pacifist and
hence could not, so Illinois said, in good conscience swear allegiance
to a state constitution that authorized the legislature to require war-
time service in the state militia-a militia into which Illinois had
drafted no one since the Civil War. Myra Bradwell took her case to
the Supreme Court, which sustained Illinois' perversity;1 more note-
worthy than justice Miller's brief affirmance' was justice Bradley's
concurrence, an opinion that can claim pride of place in the litera-
ture of misogyny.' Clyde Summers also made an unsuccessful plea
to the Supreme Court. justice Reed's affirmance for a five-justice
majority is one of the preeminently forgettable opinions in the
Court's annals.4 But Justice Black's dissent is an essay on liberty of
conscience that resonates in our constitutional memory.5 Of particu-
lar pertinence, for present purposes is justice Black's profile of Clyde
Summers at the age of twenty-six:
t Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
The author was privileged to be one of Clyde Summers' faculty colleagues both at
Yale and at the University of Pennsylvania.
I See Bradwell v. The State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall. 130) (1873).
2 Justice Miller, relying on his opinion of the day before in the Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), concluded that the right to practice law is not a
privilege of national citizenship protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
3 Justice Bradley, joined by Justices Field and Swayne, all three of whom had
dissented in Slaughter-House, see supra note 2, was of the view that, pursuant to "the law
of the Creator," Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141, women should stay home. Chief
Justice Chase, who had also dissented in Slaughter-House, dissented in Bradwell "from
the judgment of the court, and from all the opinions." Id. at 142 (Chase, C.J.,
dissenting).
4 See In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
5 See id. at 573 (Black, J., dissenting).
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The State does not deny that petitioner possesses the follow-
ing qualifications:
He is honest, moral, and intelligent, has had a college and a
law school education. He has been a law professor and fully meas-
ures up to the high standards of legal knowledge Illinois has set as
a prerequisite to admission to practice law in that State. He has
never been convicted for, or charged with, a violation of law. That
he would serve his clients faithfully and efficiently if admitted to
practice is not denied. His ideals of what a lawyer should be indi-
cate that his activities would not reflect discredit upon the bar, that
he would strive to make the legal system a more effective instru-
ment ofjustice. Because he thinks that "Lawsuits do not bring love
and brotherliness, they just create antagonisms," he would, as a
lawyer, exert himself to adjust controversies out of court, but
would vigorously press his client's cause in court if efforts to adjust
failed. Explaining to his examiners some of the reasons why he
wanted to be a lawyer, he told them: "I think there is a lot of work
to be done in the law.... I think the law has a place to see to it that
every man has a chance to eat and a chance to live equally. I think
the law has a place where people can go and get justice done for
themselves without paying too much, for the bulk of people that
are too poor."
6
II.
In the forty-four years that have elapsed since In re Summers7 was
decided, Clyde Summers has been fulfilling whatJustice Black-him-
self a lawyer for the poor before he went to the Senate and thence to
the bench'-called Summers' "vision of the law in action."9 Illinois'
myopia did not keep Summers out of court for long-New York sub-
sequently admitted him to the bar-so he has represented his share
of conscientious objectors, aliens who have run afoul of the INS, and
others whose non-conformist views or diminished status have gotten
them in trouble with the authorities. But the principle focus of Sum-
mers' professional endeavor has, of course, been as a labor law
teacher and scholar and, derivatively, as a labor arbitrator. Among
the active labor law professoriate, Summers is the senior partner. To
have become emeritus is, for him, not to have become less active.
On the contrary, it is a mandate to work harder: unceremoniously
6 Id. at 574 (Black, J., dissenting).
7 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
8 SeeJ. SIMON, THE ANTAGONISTS: HUGO BLACK, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN MODERN AMERICA 78-79, 82 (1989).
9 See In re Summers, 325 U.S. at 574 (Black, J., dissenting).
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stripped of the faculty committee responsibilities he has addressed
with such relish for almost five decades,' 0 Summers now has time to
teach, write and arbitrate more.
Others contributing to this issue of the Law Review describe and
appraise aspects of Summers' scholarship. I will not undertake that
daunting task. Rather, I will, let Summers speak for himself, by set-
ting forth an excerpt from one of his early articles. In Union Powers
and Workers' Rights," Summers in 1951 charted, defined, and
focused the profession's attention on a broad and theretofore sub-
stantially unexplored problem area: the rights of an individual
worker as against the union that purports to speak in the worker's
name and bargain in the worker's behalf. I offer the following
excerpt in evidence because I am convinced that much of the impact
of Summers' writings derives from the power of his prose-prose in
which the strength of the syllogism is matched by the strength of the
suffusing moral premises, and in which logic and morality alike are
given added urgency by simple syntax and the right words:
On January 1, 1944, the Trailmobile Company of Cincinnati
absorbed the Highland Body Manufacturing Company, taking over
all of its assets and business. All of the Highland equipment was
moved to the Trailmobile plant, and all Highland employees were
transferred to the Trailmobile payroll. The Highland workers
claimed seniority as of their dates of employment with Highland,
but the Trailmobile workers insisted that the Highland men were
new employees as of the date of transfer. Since both groups were
affiliated with the A.F. of L., the dispute was submitted to national
representatives of the A.F. of L. When they held in favor of the
Highland group, the Trailmobile employees, who outnumbered
the Highland employees ten to one, immediately reorganized into
a C.I.O. local and petitioned for an N.L.R.B. election. The new
C.I.O. local, of course, won and immediately negotiated a contract
providing that seniority of Highland employees should date from
January 1, 1944.
10 In the case of Summers, and in the cognate case of his Penn co-emeritus, Leo
Levin-and, soon, in the law school world generally, as it becomes more common for
emeriti to be induced to remain at their lecterns-the transition from tenured to
emeritus status may seem to be marked chiefly by loss of membership in such favored
faculty sub-enclaves as the admissions committee and the library committee. To the
outside observer it may not be immediately apparent that such a deprivation should
be characterized as more than damnum absque injuria. But those within the academy
know that the slightest slights are often the most difficult to bear. Whether such a
deprivation should trigger AAUP censure, or give rise to cognizable legal (including,
at a state-related institution, constitutional) claims, is beyond the scope of this essay.
I1 Summers, Union Powers and Workers' Rights, 49 MICH. L. REV. 805 (1951).
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This contract brought forth a series of suits by Highland work-
ers seeking protection of their seniority status. One of them, Hess,
brought a class suit in the Ohio courts to compel the union to
restore him and his fellow workers to their seniority rights. The
Ohio courts refused to give relief, holding that seniority rights
arose solely from contract, and the union was empowered as the
certified representative to fix those rights by the collective agree-
ment. A second suit was brought by a returned veteran, Whirls,
who claimed that because of this clause he had been demoted in
violation of his rights under the Selective Service Act. He, too,
failed to obtain relief in the courts. In the meantime, the union
retaliated by expelling Whirls for conduct unbecoming a union
member and demanding his discharge under the closed shop con-
tract. Not daunted, the Highland employees brought still another
action in the federal courts, this time to enjoin enforcement of the
seniority clause as discriminatory and in violation of the union's
duty to represent them fairly. The circuit court of appeals denied
relief, holding that this "discrimination was in pursuance of the
bargaining process, and was not without some basis." The High-
land men should not complain, said the court, for they had
obtained the closed shop (in the C.I.O.) and other "advantages."
The plight of the Highland group is not the product of labor
strife, but of collective bargaining; not of employer discrimination,
but of union power. It symbolizes in an extreme form the potential
fate of an individual worker within the structure of unionization
and collective bargaining. It sharply reminds us that contracts
apply to workers, and that unions consists of members. It warns us
that we must not become so obsessed with the glamor of studying
mass action that we ignore the fact of those who make up the mass
and in whose name the action is taken.'
2
III.
The key is integrity.
After more than twenty years as his working colleague, first at
Yale and later at Penn, I think I have come to know Clyde Summers
pretty well. I have sat in a Summers seminar-and had my head
handed to me for making a profound observation that wholly missed
the point. I have climbed the Vermont hillside on which Clyde has
planted thousands of evergreens. I have walked the stone wall he
built in Pennsylvania. I have heard him toast Evelyn at a daughter's
wedding.
12 Id. at 805-06 (footnotes omitted).
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I think I know what Clyde is made of: Humanity. Wisdom. Per-
severance. And the key is integrity.

